We reconsider the concept of internal labor markets. Given homogeneous workers, we show that establishing an internal labor market by o¤ering combined contracts across hierarchy levels strictly dominates external recruitment. This result obtains even though, in our model, …rm-speci…c human capital is not an issue and job-promotion schemes are not necessary to provide e¤ort incentives on lower ranks of the hierarchy. Instead, the result emerges because only an internal labor market can exploit workers' rents for incentive provision on lower tiers. Given unobservable heterogeneity of workers, relying on an internal labor market has the further advantage of improving the selection of high ability workers for higher ranks. However, observable worker heterogeneity gives rise to a trade-o¤ between incentive and selection issues and, as a consequence, may lead to ports of entry on higher tiers of the hierarchy. Our results are in line with empirical observations that document missing elements of strict internal labor markets and traditional tournament theory in practice.
Introduction
Based on Doeringer and Piore (1971) , Williamson, Wachter and Harris (1975) , Doeringer (1986) and others, there has been a long debate on internal labor markets. In the ideal form of an internal labor market, workers enter the …rm only on the lowest hierarchy level. Then, by accumulating …rm-speci…c human capital, workers become more productive and, hence, more suitable for jobs on higher tiers of the hierarchy. Therefore, workers are promoted along structured career paths within the hierarchy. The rules of a strict internal labor market do not allow for external recruiting on higher hierarchy levels because this would diminish internal e¤ort incentives arising from competition for promotion. Furthermore, to generate incentives via job promotion tournaments, wages should be attached to jobs on each tier of the hierarchy.
In this paper, we reconsider the theory of internal labor markets and identify new important advantages of internal promotion policies. We do so by comparing two di¤erent kinds of employment contracts. The …rst contract corresponds to a stylized internal labor market. We call this contractual form a combined contract because it interlinks the incentive schemes on the …rm's di¤erent hierarchical tiers by a strict internal promotion rule. The second kind of contract describes just the opposite alternative as it focuses on spot contracting and allows for external hiring on higher hierarchy levels. We call this alternative separate contracts because the incentive schemes from the di¤erent hierarchical tiers do not interact: The …rm chooses an optimal contract for each single tier of the hierarchy.
First, we focus on the case of homogeneous workers and show that an internal labor market in form of a combined contract dominates separate contracts. This result emerges even though we neglect the accumulation of …rm-speci…c human capital and, moreover, in our model promotion tournaments are not essential to provide e¤ort incentives on lower tiers of the hierarchy. In other words, two essential features of an internal labor market are missing but it still turns out to be the preferred contractual solution. The rationale for this result is as follows. We consider the realistic setting where workers are protected by limited liability and, thus, earn positive rents under any contract form. These rents lead to a speci…c advantage of an internal labor market in comparison to separate contracts: With an internal labor market, workers'rents can be used to enhance e¤ort incentives for lower-level workers, which is impossible under separate contracts. As a consequence, under combined contracts, the …rm optimally leaves larger rents to higher-level workers than under separate contracts but still incurs lower overall costs of inducing e¤ort. Surprisingly, combined contracts may even lead to the implementation of …rst-best e¤ort on higher tiers.
Recently, contract theorists as Schmitz (2005) have pointed out that optimal bonus payments that lead to positive rents can be reinterpreted as e¢ ciency wages. Since, in general, rents are strictly increasing in e¤ort in single-agent hidden action models with continuous e¤ort, the implemented e¤ort level is ine¢ ciently small. By contrast, in our model the …rm may implement …rst-best e¤ort although it is associated with a strictly positive rent, which also monotonically increases in e¤ort. Hence, in our context we obtain e¢ ciency wages in a more literal sense.
In a second step, we introduce unobserved heterogeneity of workers so that neither the …rm nor the workers themselves perfectly learn individual worker productivity. We can show that an internal labor market in form of a combined contract still dominates separate contracts. In addition to the incentive advantage under homogeneity, internal labor markets exhibit the extra bene…t of improved selection quality compared to separate contracts when …lling positions on higher hierarchy levels. In our setting, e¤ort and ability of workers are complements so that both the incentive and the selection advantage reinforce each other.
Finally, our analysis points out that the strict form of an internal labor market is not always optimal: If there is observed heterogeneity of workers (i.e., the …rm learns workers' abilities during the beginning of their careers), the …rm can use this additional information to improve worker selection, which now may include the possibility of external recruitment on higher hierarchy levels.
The last paragraph indicates that our …ndings partially depart from the traditional view of strict internal labor markets. However, our results are in line with empirical facts that also contradict a strict internal labor market and, in addition, standard theory of job-promotion tournaments.
1 In this sense, our paper follows the advice of Waldman (forthcoming) to develop a more sophisticated tournament model that can explain these empirical …ndings: We introduce a new approach that combines job-promotion tournaments with additional incentive schemes. 2 Besides 1 See the seminal papers by Lazear and Rosen (1981) and Nalebu¤ and Stiglitz (1983) on tournaments in labor economics.
2 Hence, our approach builds on the general insight by Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994b, p. 921) : "None of the major theories of wage determination can alone explain the evidence." As an alternative to our approach, Gibbons and Waldman (1999) have combined job assignment, human the fact that in organizational practice we can frequently observe the coexistence of job-promotion tournaments and bonus schemes in the same …rm, our modi…ed tournament model is in line with the following three empirical puzzles that have been highlighted particularly by Holmström (1994a, 1994b): 3 First, there is considerable variation in pay on each hierarchy level, which contradicts the important prerequisite of tournaments that wages must be attached to jobs in order to generate incentives.
Second, promotion premiums that are paid to workers when moving to higher levels in the hierarchy can explain only part of the hierarchical wage di¤er-ences in …rms. Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström show that often hierarchical wage di¤erences are even …ve times higher (or more) than the corresponding promotion premiums.
Third, we can observe external recruiting on higher hierarchy levels, which would erase incentives from internal job-promotion tournaments.
In our model of a two-tier hierarchy, promoted workers earn high or low bonuses depending on success or failure on the second hierarchy level. Thus, we have a natural variation in pay on the second tier, which resolves the …rst puzzle. As a promoted worker earns both relative performance pay and bonuses, hierarchical wage increases are only in part determined by job promotion, hence illuminating the second puzzle. In this context, one of the empirical …ndings by Dohmen, Kriechel, and Pfann (2004) is interesting. Contrary to other …rm studies, they are able to determine the exact point in time when a worker realizes a pay increase, and they …nd that promotion and wage increase are often not simultaneous. This observation …ts quite well to our model. Finally, under observed worker heterogeneity, the …rm may hire externally with some positive probability to improve selection, which explains the third puzzle on ports of entry on higher hierarchy levels.
Our paper is related to those two tournament models that also combine a rankorder tournament with additional incentive schemes. Tsoulouhas, Knoeber, and Agrawal (2007) analyze optimal handicapping of internal and external candidates capital investments and learning in order to explain the empirical …ndings.
in a contest to become CEO. To do so, they consider a promotion tournament where the prize is given by the incentive contract on the next hierarchy level. However, apart from addressing a quite di¤erent question, their model also di¤ers from ours in several respects. First, they do not allow for relative performance pay on the …rst tier of the hierarchy. Second, they assume that the …rm cannot commit to a secondperiod contract at the beginning of the game. 4 Furthermore, even though promoted agents are of limited liability, they do not earn rents due to their high reservation utility. Schöttner and Thiele (forthcoming) also investigate incentive contracting within a two-tier hierarchy, but consider a di¤erent production environment with an individual and contractible performance signal on the …rst tier. They examine the optimal combination of piece rates for level-1 workers and a promotion tournament to the next tier. Ohlendorf and Schmitz (2008) do not analyze tournaments, but combine two principal-agent contracts in successive periods. As in our model, the agent is wealthconstrained and earns a non-negative rent that can be used for incentive purposes. Compared to our paper, Ohlendorf and Schmitz consider a completely di¤erent scenario with a single agent. In their model, the principal is integrated in the production process and can invest in each of the two periods. Hence, the natural application of their model is a supplier-buyer relationship where the principal can either continue or terminate the joint project after the …rst period. In the OhlendorfSchmitz paper, optimal second-period incentives serve as a carrot or a stick since they depend on …rst-period success.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we introduce our basic model. Section 3 o¤ers a solution to this model, comparing a combined contract with two separate contracts under homogeneous workers. In Section 4, we extend the basic model by introducing worker heterogeneity. Section 5 concludes.
The Basic Model
We consider two representative periods in the lifespan of a …rm that consists of two hierarchy levels. In the …rst period, the …rm needs to hire two workers for hierarchy level 1. In the second period, the …rm has to …ll one position on hierarchy level 4 However, the authors also discuss an extension where commitment is possible.
2. The tasks to be performed on the two hierarchy levels di¤er in their nature. On level 1, workers ful…ll production tasks. By contrast, on level 2, we have a managerial task. Initially, we assume that all workers share the same abilities in both tasks. However, in Section 4, we also discuss the case of heterogeneous workers. Furthermore, all players are risk neutral. Workers are protected by limited liability, i.e., the …rm cannot exact payments from workers. On both tiers of the hierarchy, workers have zero reservation values. For simplicity, we neglect discounting.
The tasks associated with the two hierarchical tiers lead to qualitatively di¤erent performance signals. On hierarchy level 1, a worker's e¤ort does not generate an individually attributable output. Accordingly, the …rm has only coarse information about the workers' relative contribution to …rm success. Technically, it observes a non-veri…able relative performance signal that provides information about which worker has performed better. By contrast, the managerial task on level 2 is accompanied by personal responsibility and, thus, leads to an individual performance measure that is veri…able. These assumptions …t well with stylized empirical facts. Nowadays, many …rms employ holistic work organization on lower hierarchy levels where the blurring of occupational barriers makes the collection of veri…able, individual performance signals prohibitively costly or even impossible. Instead, …rms rely on subjective performance evaluations by workers'superiors.
5 Sharper demarcation lines between jobs resulting in contractible individual performance signals are more likely to arise on managerial ranks of the hierarchy. For example, the position on level 2 may be head of a department or a division. On the …rst hierarchy level, each of the two workers i (i = A; B) exerts e¤ort e i 0. The e¤ort has a non-veri…able monetary valuev (ê i ) to the …rm withv 0 ( ) > 0 andv 00 ( ) 0. The …rm neither observesê i norv (ê i ), but receives a non-veri…able ordinal signalŝ 2 fŝ A ;ŝ B g about the relative performance of the two workers. The signalŝ =ŝ A indicates that worker A has performed best, whereasŝ =ŝ B means that worker B has performed better relative to his co-worker. The probability of the eventŝ =ŝ A is given byp (ê A ;ê B ) and that ofŝ =ŝ B by 1 p (ê A ;ê B ). We assume that the probability functionp (ê A ;ê B ) exhibits the properties of the well-known contest-success function introduced by Dixit (1987): 6 5 In particular, see Ichniowski, Shaw and Prennushi (1997) and Lindbeck and Snower 2000) on holistic organizations. Subjective performance evaluation is also an integral part of the traditional personnel policy of Japanese …rms; see, e.g., Koike 1988 , Endo 1994 6 Subscripts of p ( ; ) denote partial derivatives.
p 12 > 0 ,p > 0:5: According to (ii), exerting e¤ort has positive but decreasing marginal returns. Property (iii) implies that if, initially, player A has chosen higher e¤ort than B, a marginal increase inê B will make it more attractive to A to increaseê A as well, due to the more intense competition the increase ofê B has caused.
Spending e¤ortê i leads to costsĉ (ê i ) for worker i (i = A; B) withĉ (0) =ĉ
Furthermore, to guarantee some regularity conditions, we make the following technical assumptions. To ensure concavity of the …rm's objective function, we assume thatĉ 0 (ê) =p 1 (ê;ê) is convex for allê > 0.
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Finally, to obtain an interior solution, we assume thatĉ 00 (0) = 0.
On the second hierarchy level, a worker's e¤ort generates an individual performance signal. Following the binary-signal model by Demougin and Garvie (1991) and Demougin and Fluet (2001) Milgrom (1981) . Let the probability of this favorable outcome be p(e) with p 0 (e) > 0 (strict monotone likelihood ratio property) and p 00 (e) < 0 (convexity of the distribution function condition).
If the …rm assigns worker i to the management task, i's e¤ort choice e yields the …rm a non-veri…able monetary value v (e) with v 0 ( ) > 0 and v 00 ( ) 0. Again, neither e nor its monetary value is observable by the …rm. 8 Exerting e¤ort e entails costs c (e) to the worker on level 2 with c (0) = c 0 (0) = 0 and c 0 (e) > 0, c 00 (e) > 0 for all e > 0. Furthermore, analogous to the technical assumptions for the …rst hierarchy level, c 0 (e) =p 0 (e) is assumed to be convex for all e > 0, 9 and c 00 (0) = 0.
In the given setting, the …rm can use three di¤erent instruments to provide incentives: First, it can employ relative performance pay (i.e., a rank-order tournament) on hierarchy level 1. Under relative performance pay, the better performing worker receives a high wage w H whereas the other worker obtains a low wage w L . 7 This condition holds for a wide range of functions; for example, let e¤ort costs be quadratic c (ê) =ê 2 and the contest-success function be of the Tullock typep (ê A ;ê B ) =ê A = (ê A +ê B ). 8 Note that v ( ) measures the worker's contribution to total …rm pro…ts and is not identical with department or division pro…ts.
9 Let, for example, costs be quadratic c (e) = e 2 and the probability function be p (e) = e with 2 (0; 1).
Hence, worker i earns w H ifŝ = s i . Otherwise, he obtains w L : Second, the …rm can install a bonus scheme on hierarchy level 2. In case of a favorable signal (s = s H ) the worker gets a high bonus b H , whereas he receives a low bonus b L if the signal is bad news (s = s L ). Due to limited liability, payments must always be non-negative (w L ; w H ; b L ; b H 0). Third, the …rm can interlink the two hierarchy levels by committing to establish an internal labor market (or job-promotion scheme) where the better performing worker from level 1 will be promoted to level 2 at the end of the …rst period. Note that, even thoughŝ is unveri…able, the …rm does not have an incentive to renege on such a promotion rule because workers are homogeneous in the basic model. Consequently, it does not matter which worker is assigned to the management position. Thus, the job-promotion scheme exhibits the important self-commitment property pointed out by Malcomson (1984 Malcomson ( , 1986 . According to these incentive devices, the …rm can o¤er one of the following two types of contracts. Under the …rst type, the …rm designs separate contracts for each tier of the hierarchy. In this case, the assignment of a worker to the level-2 job is purely random: The candidate can either be hired from the external labor market or be chosen from the internal pool of workers. This kind of contract clearly di¤ers from the ideal of an internal labor market that allows for a port of entry only on the lowest hierarchy level. By contrast, the second type of contract follows the idea of an internal labor market by combining both hierarchy levels via a job-promotion scheme (combined contract). The contract details are speci…ed in Section 3, where we analyze incentives and worker behavior under each contractual form.
Homogeneous Workers

Separate Contracts
We start our analysis of the basic model with homogeneous workers by considering the case of separate contracts. Then, the time schedule of the game is as follows. First, the …rm o¤ers two workers a one-period contract specifying relative performance pay (w L ; w H ) for employment on hierarchy level 1. Provided that the workers accept the contract, they exert e¤ortsê A andê B , respectively. Afterwards, s is observed. The workers then obtain w L or w H , respectively, whereas the …rm receivesv (ê A ) +v (ê B ).
Next, the …rm has to hire an individual for the management job on hierarchy level 2. The …rm o¤ers a randomly chosen internal or external worker a one-period contract (b L ; b H ) based on the performance signal s on hierarchy level 2. After acceptance of the contract, the level-2 worker chooses e¤ort e yielding either a low or a high bonus payment. The …rm earns v (e). The timing is summarized in the following …gure. 
The …rm maximizes its pro…t net of wage payments taking into account the incentive constraint (1), the participation constraint (2), and the limited-liability constraints (3). Due to the monotone likelihood ratio property and the convexity of the distribution function condition, the incentive constraint (1) is equivalent to its …rst-order condition
Using this relationship, the …rm's problem can be transformed to
Regarding the participation constraint, we can make the following observation, which is important for our further analysis.
is strictly positive and monotonically increasing for all e > 0.
Proof. r(e) > 0 can be rewritten as c (e) c 0 (e)
0 (e) > 0 is true since p ( ) is strictly concave. But then we also have
< c (e) ec 0 (e) < 0 from the strict convexity of c ( ). The derivative
i is positive for all e > 0 by strict concavity of p(e) and strict convexity of c(e). Intuitively, since the worker is protected by limited liability, the …rm has to leave him a rent. As a result, the …rm's costs for inducing e¤ort e are composed of the worker's e¤ort costs, c(e), and his rent r(e). Now we turn to hierarchy level 1. Here, two workers compete in a tournament for relative performance pay w H and w L . We …rst characterize the workers'e¤ort 10 Due to our technical assumptions, the objective function is strictly concave; r 00 (e) > 0 follows from c 0 (e) =p 0 (e) being convex. Furthermore, the assumption c 00 (0) = 0 ensures an interior solution.
choices. Given the wages w H and w L , worker A chooses his e¤ort level to solve
whereas worker B solves
The equilibrium e¤ort levels must satisfy the …rst-order conditions
Recall that, due to the symmetry property (i) of the probability functionp ( ; ) we havep (ê B ;ê A ) = 1 p (ê A ;ê B ). Di¤erentiating both sides with respect toê B yieldŝ
so that the …rst-order conditions can be rewritten as
Thus, we have a unique symmetric equilibrium
Condition (9) shows that equilibrium e¤orts increase in the tournament prize spread
12 To simplify notation, we denote by w(ê) the prize spread that induces e¤ortê, i.e.,
The …rm maximizes 2v (ê) w L w H subject to the incentive constraint (9), the participation constraint
and the limited-liability constraints
Note that, when choosing the equilibrium e¤ortê, a worker must obtain at least the same expected payment as if he exerted zero e¤ort, i.e.,
Hence,
Together with (9), it follows that w s H = w(ê) is optimal. Thus, the …rm implements the e¤ort levelê s > 0 given by
The results of this subsection are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Under separate contracts, the …rm implements the e¤ort levelŝ
e s = arg max e fv (e) r(e) c(e)g :
The optimal contract elements are
where r(e) and w(ê) are given by (6) and (10), respectively.
From Lemma 1, it follows that the worker on level 2 earns a strictly positive rent r(e s ). This suggests that the …rm may bene…t from establishing an internal labor market where the better performing level-1 worker is promoted to the next hierarchy level. Then, the level-2 rent provides additional e¤ort incentives for the 13 In the symmetric equilibrium, each worker's winning probability is 1/2. 14 The second-order condition 2v 00 (ê) w 00 (ê) < 0 is satis…ed due to our technical assumption thatĉ 0 (ê) =p 1 (ê;ê) is convex. An interior solution is guaranteed byĉ 00 (0) = 0.
…rst hierarchy level. An approach that uses a strict internal promotion rule according to past performance corresponds to our combined contract, which we analyze in the following subsection.
Combined Contract
This subsection considers combined contracts, which correspond to a purely internal labor market. Under a combined contract, the …rm o¤ers two workers a contract
at the start of the …rst period. The contract includes the commitment to promote the better performing level-1 worker to level 2 in the second period, i.e., worker i will be promoted if and only ifŝ =ŝ i . Then, in the second period, the promoted worker will be paid according to the pre-speci…ed bonus scheme. For simplicity, we assume that the worker who did not achieve promotion is dismissed. Furthermore, the worker selected for promotion can quit and realize his reservation value of zero in the second period.
The following …gure summarizes the timing under a combined contract. The time schedule di¤ers from the one under separate contracts only with respect to stages 1 and 4. Under a combined contract, at stage 1, the …rm o¤ers two workers a contract (w L ; w H ; b L ; b H ) that covers the following two periods. At stage 4, the …rm promotes the better level-1 worker to the next tier.
Again, the game is solved by backwards induction. In the second period, given the bonus payments b L and b H , the promoted worker faces the same kind of decision problem as under separate contracts. Provided that his participation constraint (2) is satis…ed, he chooses the e¤ort level characterized by (1). In the …rst period, however, workers'optimization problems fundamentally di¤er from the case of two separate contracts. Now, increasing e¤ort also raises the chance of being promoted and, consequently, earning a rent under the bonus contract. Hence, worker A's and B's optimization problems, respectively, are:
Comparing the workers' objective functions with those under separate contracts, (7) and (8), we can see that, under combined contracts, the "prize"for performing better on level 1 increases by the expected payment to the promoted worker,
Analogously to the case of separate contracts, one can show that there is a unique symmetric equilibrium given bŷ
The …rst-period participation constraint thus is
Now we can state the …rm's optimization problem:
By solving this problem, we obtain the following result.
Proposition 2 Under a combined contract, the …rm implements the e¤ort levels
subject to w(ê) r(e) 0:
15 The limited-liability constraints b L ; b H 0 imply that a promoted worker cannot be held liable to the extent of his tournament prize w H . This assumption is justi…ed when workers can use their tournament prizes for consumption before the second period ends or, alternatively, when workers are protected by a strict liability limit of zero after failure at the bonus stage. However, in the additional pages for the referees we show that replacing (23) by w L 0, w H + b L 0 and w H + b H 0 would not alter our results.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Comparison of the Two Contracts
Given Propositions 1 and 2, we are now able to investigate the question which of the two contracts the …rm prefers to implement. Our conjecture was that the combined contract may have the advantage of partially substituting direct …rst-level incentives w H w L for indirect incentives which arise due to the prospect of the expected second-period rent r(e). By comparing the optimal contract elements (16) and (26), it becomes clear that this is indeed the case because we have w
When we examine the …rm's objective functions under separate contracts (see (14) and (15)) and a combined contract (see (24)), we can see that this substitution of incentives has the consequence that the …rm's costs of inducing a given pair of e¤ort levels (ê; e) are strictly lower under combined contracts: w(ê) + c(e) as opposed to w(ê) + r(e) + c(e). However, in contrast to the case of separate contracts, the …rm's optimization problem under combined contracts exhibits a constraint, (25). At …rst sight, one might think that this constraint restricts the set of feasible e¤ort pairs (ê; e) under combined contracts and is, thus, detrimental but such a conclusion would be wrong. As the proof of Proposition 2 shows, constraint (25) arises because, for any given level-2 e¤ort e, the …rm always wants to use the entire associated rent to enhance …rst-level incentives. In other words, given e, the …rm wishes to implement at least the …rst-level e¤ortê that workers are willing to spend to win r(e), i.e., w(ê) r(e). To induce a level-1 e¤ort with w(ê) < r(e), the …rm would have to punish good performance on the …rst tier by setting w H < w L . This cannot be optimal because the …rm would actually pay for reducing e¤ort. Hence, a combined contract only has advantages over two separate contract and is, therefore, optimal given that workers are homogeneous. 16 To characterize e¤ort under the optimal combined contract, it is necessary to distinguish whether restriction (25) is binding or not at the optimum. First, assume the constraint is not binding. Then, e¤ort on the second hierarchy level corresponds to the …rst-best e¤ort level, i.e., e c = e F B = arg max e fv (e) c(e)g ;
as can be seen from (24). Hence, under the combined contract, level-2 e¤ort is larger than under separate contracts. Concerning the …rst hierarchy level, however, a comparison of (14) and (24) points out thatê c =ê s . Thus, interestingly, the use of second-level rents for incentive purposes on hierarchy level 1 does not lead to higher e¤ort on that hierarchy level. Instead, only second-tier e¤ort increases. This result is due to the fact that raising incentives on the second tier increases e¤orts on both levels, but level-1 e¤orts are then decreased again by reducing w H w L . Hence, direct …rst-level incentives stemming from relative performance pay are simply replaced by indirect ones. This observation can be related to the concept of e¢ ciency wages, which has been reconsidered by contract theorists in the last decade. According to Tirole (1999, p. 745) , La¤ont and Martimort (2002, p. 174) , and Schmitz (2005) , e¢ ciency wages occur if workers are protected by limited liability and earn positive rents under the optimal contract. In their models, the implemented e¤ort level is ine¢ ciently small. By contrast, in our setting the …rm implements the e¢ cient e¤ort level e F B although this entails a strictly positive rent that is monotonically increasing in e¤ort. Hence, combining both hierarchy levels for creating optimal incentives allows for e¢ ciency wages in a more literal sense. As a crucial condition, the associated rent r(e F B ) must not be too large, i.e., w(ê s ) > r(e F B ). Otherwise, restriction (25) Proof. See Appendix. Proposition 3 shows that, when workers are homogeneous, an internal labor market with a job-promotion scheme (i.e., the combined contract) strictly dominates contractual solutions that allow external recruiting on higher hierarchy levels (i.e., separate contracts). Interestingly, strict dominance holds even though in our model internal labor markets do not foster the accumulation of …rm-speci…c human capital and level-1 incentives can also be provided without using a job-promotion scheme, i.e., by relative performance pay.
Following the traditional view, an internal labor market has the major disadvantage of protecting workers'rents by excluding competition with external workers. In our setting, a similar situation arises: Under the combined contract, a worker's rent on hierarchy level 2 is larger than under separate contracts. However, this actually re ‡ects a comparative advantage of internal labor markets in contrast to alternative personnel policies that allow external hiring on higher levels: By utilizing a job-promotion scheme, higher-level rents are pro…tably used for incentive purposes on lower hierarchical tiers. This is impossible under external recruitment. Given that an internal labor market allows the …rm to use rents as an incentive device, the …rm …nds it optimal to leave higher rents to workers than under external recruitment.
Proposition 3 enables us to fully characterize the contracting environments that may arise in the …rm with homogeneous workers. In addition to a job-promotion scheme, the …rm will implement both a bonus scheme and relative performance pay if the rent for implementing …rst-best e¤ort on hierarchy level 2 is not too large (case (ii) of Proposition 3). In such a situation, the …rm makes use of moderate relative performance pay on the …rst tier by choosing a tournament winner prize 
, which is larger than the high bonus under separate contracts (b
). However, if the rent for implementing e F B is rather large (case (iii) of Proposition 3), the …rm foregoes relative performance pay on the …rst tier 17 and, thus, solely relies on indirect level-1 incentives through the second-period rent.
Our results are nicely in line with two empirical observations that contradict standard models on job-promotion tournaments. Holmström (1994a, 1994b) analyze the internal structure and the wage policy of a US corporation.
18 As a …rst puzzling result, they …nd considerable variation in pay on each hierarchy level (see Figure VI in Baker, Gibbs and, Holmström 1994a, p. 906) . This …nding contradicts the important prerequisite of standard job-promotion tournaments that wages must be attached to jobs and, therefore, to hierarchy levels in order to generate incentives. In our model, under the combined contract we have a job-promotion tournament with pay variation because the promoted worker may or may not receive a bonus on hierarchy level 2. Furthermore, according to standard job-promotion tournaments, hierarchical wage di¤erences should be completely explained by promotion premiums paid to workers when moving to higher levels in the hierarchy. However, Baker, Gibbs, and Holmström (1994a) …nd that "promotion premiums explain only part of the di¤er-ences in pay between levels"(p. 909). In fact, often hierarchical wage di¤erences are even …ve times higher (or more) than the corresponding promotion premiums. This second puzzling observation is also in line with our modi…ed tournament model. Under the combined contract, a promoted worker does not only earn the promotion premium w H w L but may also receive a bonus. In particular, the higher the expected rent on hierarchy level 2, the smaller will be the optimal promotion premium. The reason is that indirect incentives replace direct ones. Presuming that e¤ort on higher hierarchy levels is more valuable to …rms than e¤ort choices on lower levels, 19 we will have considerable rents on higher tiers, thus reducing corresponding promotion premiums. So far, we have shown that an internal labor market structure in form of a combined contract with a job-promotion scheme is optimal when workers are ho-17 Note that, since w(ê c ) = r(e c ), we must have w c H = 0: 18 The empirical puzzles documented by Holmström (1994a, 1994b) are also found by Treble et al. (2001) , who analyzed a British …rm. Considerable wage variation within job levels is also documented by the empirical studies of Seltzer and Merrett (2000) , Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004) , Gibbs and Hendricks (2004) and Grund (2005) . Moreover, Dohmen, Kriechel and Pfann (2004) show that promotion and wage increase are often not simultaneous, which gives further evidence that salaries are also determined by bonuses and not solely by promotion premiums.
19 That is, the …rm's value function for e¤ort increases more steeply on higher hierarchy levels.
mogeneous. However, in practice workers typically di¤er in their abilities. In that case, selection of high-ability workers becomes an issue. In the next section, we therefore consider worker heterogeneity and investigate whether an internal labor market is still optimal.
Heterogeneous Workers
In this section, we extend our basic model to two situations where workers potentially di¤er in their abilities. In one situation, we assume that a worker's ability is revealed to the …rm after one period of interaction. Such characteristics could be soft skills such as social competence, the capability to lead and motivate people, or to oversee complex production processes. However, other characteristics of a worker's ability may remain unrevealed for some time, which is the other situation that we analyze. We start with the latter case of unobserved heterogeneity, where workers'abilities do not become observable during the two periods of employment. In Subsection 4.2, we analyze a situation in which the …rm learns individual worker abilities during the …rst period. The …rm can use this information for …lling the management position on the second tier. Thus, in both situations, the incentive problem is now supplemented by a selection problem.
Unobserved Worker Heterogeneity
Modi…cations of the Basic Model
Neither the …rm nor the workers themselves can observe worker abilities during the two periods of employment. We assume that this aspect of unobserved ability persists over time and hierarchy levels, i.e., it is not task speci…c. Because it is not possible to observe a worker's individual output on the …rst hierarchy level, the …rm cannot deduce marginal productivity at the end of the …rst period. Let each worker either have high unobservable talent t 1 or low unobservable talent t 0 with t 1 > t 0 > 0. Neither the workers nor the …rm observe the workers'individual talents during the whole game. In other words, we introduce symmetric uncertainty about the quality of the workers. 20 All players (i.e., the workers and the …rm) have the same prior distribution about worker talent. For simplicity, let each talent be equally likely so that unobservable talent can be described by a random variable t that takes values t 0 and t 1 with probability 1 2
, respectively, and has mean E [t] = (t 0 + t 1 ) =2. On each hierarchy level, a worker's talent in ‡uences both the value of e¤ort for the …rm and the probability of generating a favorable signal. Let the value of worker i (i = A; B) to the …rm when exerting e¤ortê i on level 1 be t v (ê i ), and that on level 2 when choosing e¤ort e be t v (e). In analogy, the probability of a favorable signal on level 2 is now given by t p (e), with t 1 p (e) 1 for all e. For a relative performance signal on level 1 we have to di¤erentiate four possible situations. If both workers have equal talents, A's probability of winning the tournament will again be described by the functionp (ê A ;ê B ). In addition, now we also have two possible asymmetric pairings. If worker A has high talent t 1 and worker B low talent t 0 , A's probability of getting the better evaluation will be described byp (ê A ;ê B ; t 1 ) whereas B's one is given by 1 p (ê A ;ê B ; t 1 ). In the opposite asymmetric case with B being more talented than A, worker A wins the tournament with probabilitŷ p (ê A ;ê B ; t 0 ) and B with probability 1 p (ê A ;ê B ; t 0 ).
We assume that the new probability functions have analogous properties (i)-(iii) as the functionp ( ; ) (see Section 2). For example, in the basic model we havep 1 (ê j ;ê i ) = p 2 (ê i ;ê j ), which follows from the symmetry assumption (i). In analogy, we assume that also in heterogeneous pairings the speci…c identity of a certain worker does not have any in ‡uence on his (marginal) winning probability, that is whether a worker acts on the …rst or on the second position inp ( ; ; t) does not in ‡uence the (marginal) returns of his e¤ort choice for a given asymmetric pairing. Technically, this means thatp (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) = 1 p (ê j ;ê i ; t 0 ), implyinĝ p 1 (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) = p 2 (ê j ;ê i ; t 0 ) andp 2 (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) = p 1 (ê j ;ê i ; t 0 )
for i; j = A; B; i 6 = j. Of course, talent should have an impact on a worker's absolute winning probability and his marginal one. In particular, we assume that, for given e¤ort levels, the more talented worker has a higher winning probability than the less talented one, i.e.,
Furthermore, let e¤ort and talent be complements in the sense of p 1 (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) >p 1 (ê i ;ê j ; t 0 ) and p 2 (ê i ;ê j ; t 0 ) > p 2 (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) ;
that is marginally increasing e¤ort is more e¤ective under high talent than under low one. Properties (ii) and (iii) from the basic model also hold analogously for heterogeneous workers. Note that property (iii) together with symmetry here implies thatp 12 (ê;ê; t 1 ) = p 12 (ê;ê; t 0 ): If workers choose identical e¤orts the more able one has a higher winning probability; if now the other worker increases his e¤ort, competition becomes more intense so that the more able worker raises his e¤ort, too. Again, this e¤ect is assumed to be independent of whether a worker acts on the …rst or on the second position inp ( ; ; t). Finally, we assume analogous regularity conditions to hold as in the basic model of Section 2.
In the following, we will investigate how the comparison between separate contracts and a combined contract will change when workers are characterized by unobserved heterogeneity.
Separate Contracts
We …rst consider the case of separate contracts. The equilibrium on hierarchy level 1 is now described by the …rst-order conditions
Usingp 1 (ê B ;ê A ) = p 2 (ê A ;ê B ) and (27) shows that there exists a symmetric equilibrium in which each worker choosesê characterized by
with w(ê) := 4ĉ 0 (ê) p 1 (ê;ê; t 1 ) +p 1 (ê;ê; t 0 ) + 2p 1 (ê;ê) 
On hierarchy level 2, the …rm's optimization problem now reads as
In analogy to the basic model, the incentive constraint can be replaced with the
. It is straightforward to show that, under the optimal bonus contract, we have b s L = 0. Furthermore, the participation constraint is identical to (5) and the …rm thus implements e¤ort e 
and r (e) being de…ned in (6). Altogether, the comparison of (32) and (33) with (14) and (15) from the basic model shows that introducing unobserved heterogeneity leads to changes in the expected values of the workers' e¤ort choices and in the optimal winner prize w H , but leaves the implementation costs on level 2 unchanged for a given e¤ort level e.
Combined Contract
Now we turn to the analysis of the combined contract. Solving the game by backwards induction, we …rst consider the actions on hierarchy level 2. Here, all players 21 Note that @ @ê (p 1 (ê;ê; t 1 ) +p 1 (ê;ê; t 0 ) + 2p 1 (ê;ê)) =p 11 (ê;ê; t 1 ) +p 12 (ê;ê; t 1 ) +p 11 (ê;ê; t 0 ) +p 12 (ê;ê; t 0 ) + 2p 11 (ê;ê) + 2p 12 (ê;ê) < 0.
22 Note that, due to the symmetric equilibrium, the participation constraint will be the same as in the basic model. 23 Here and in the following, the subscript "h" for optimal e¤orts indicates heterogeneity of workers.
update their beliefs about the unknown talent of the promoted worker. Let E [tjŝ] denote the expected talent of the promoted worker, that is each player calculates a new expectation depending on the realization of the relative performance signal s. Note that at any prior point in time the workers as well as the …rm already know that they have to update their beliefs in light of the promotion decision and that they will not receive further information. Hence, when designing the optimal combined contract, the …rm has to include the incentive constraint
and the participation constraint
where the last inequality follows from (6) and (34). At level 1, worker A and worker B maximize
respectively. Equations (6) and (34) together with the …rst-order conditions,p 1 (ê B ;ê A ) = p 2 (ê A ;ê B ) and (27) yield
Thus, in the symmetric equilibrium each worker exertsê described by
with w(ê) being de…ned in (31).
Now we can state the …rm's problem. It maximizes
subject to the limited-liability constraints (23), the incentive constraints (34) and (36), the participation constraint for the second hierarchy level (35) and the participation constraint for the …rst level, (34); (36) ,
Moreover, the …rm has to take into account that E [tjŝ] depends on the workers' equilibrium e¤orts chosen on hierarchy level 1:
with t := t 1 t 0 . Thus, the posterior expectation is larger than the prior one because the more talented worker is promoted with higher probability in case of an asymmetric pairing in the tournament. Furthermore, the posterior mean strictly increases in level-1 equilibrium e¤orts as talent and e¤ort are complements:
Applying the same two-step procedure as in the basic model yields that the …rm implements the e¤ort pair (ê 
subject to w(ê) r (e) 0:
When comparing optimal e¤orts under the combined contract with those under two separate contracts, we have to distinguish whether the restriction (40) is binding or not at the optimum. In case of a non-binding restriction, optimal e¤orts (ê c h ; e c h ) are described by the …rst-order conditions
Comparing the …rst equation with (32) 
> 0. The …rm's objective function under a combined contract can be rewritten as
The …rst-order condition yields
Inserting for @e=@ê leads to
Since the …rst two expressions as well as r 0 (e (ê)) and w 0 (ê) are positive, the numerator of the last expression is negative. As this numerator is a strictly concave function of e (ê) and since
, we obtain from the comparison with (33) that e c h > e s h . Finally, we have to consider optimal e¤ort implementation on hierarchy level 1. 24 See the additional pages for the referees.
Since (40) is binding, the e¤ortê that would maximize level 1-pro…t corresponds to a level-2 e¤ort that is below the e¤ort e that maximizes level-2 pro…t E [tjŝ] v (e) c (e). Hence, the …rm may be interested in further raisingê. As both pro…t functions are strictly concave, we can apply the same argument as in the proof of Proposition 3: The …rm would, thus, never implement a smallerê than the optimal e¤ort under a non-binding restriction. Since that e¤ort was larger than the optimal level-1 e¤ort under separate contracts, we have proved thatê Proposition 4 points out that, under a combined contract, the …rm implements strictly larger e¤orts on hierarchy level 1 than under separate contracts. This result sharply contrasts with our …ndings in Proposition 3 on homogeneous workers. The intuition comes from the fact that, in case of unobservable talent, the …rm has an additional motive for implementing large e¤orts on hierarchy level 1: The larger e the higher will be the probability that the worker of higher unobserved talent is promoted to level 2 in case of a heterogeneous pairing, i.e.,p 1 (ê;ê; t 1 ) > 0. This, in turn, increases the posterior expected talent of the promoted worker: @E [tjŝ] =@ê > 0 according to (38) since E [tjŝ] monotonically increases inp (ê;ê; t 1 ). In other words, if workers have unobservable characteristics that persist across hierarchy levels, higher incentives on level 1 improve worker selection for level 2. The reason is that incentives and selection are strictly interlinked.
Again, from a pure incentive perspective, the …rm is strictly better o¤ by choosing a combined contract. Analogously to the basic model, the combined contract will lead to …rst-best e¤ort on hierarchy level 2, i.e. e (40) is not binding. However, there is a crucial di¤erence in comparison to the basic model. With unobserved talents, we have the additional e¤ect that combining both hierarchy levels via a job-promotion scheme even improves on …rst-best implementation under uncertainty as E [tjŝ] > E [t] . By inducing large e¤ortsê on level 1, the …rm raises the posterior expected talent of the promoted worker (i.e. @E [tjŝ] =@ê > 0) which, in turn, increases the e¢ cient e¤ort level e c h on level 2 that maximizes E [tjŝ] v (e) c (e).
Finally, we want to compare the selection properties of the di¤erent contractual forms with respect to unobserved worker heterogeneity. Under separate contracts, according to the prior distribution, the probability of …lling the level-2 job with a high-ability worker is 1=2. In case of a combined contract, we have again to distinguish between four possible matches in period 1. With probability 1=4 we have two high-ability workers matched in period 1, with the same probability two low-ability workers meet in the tournament. With the remaining probability 1=2 there is a heterogeneous match between a low-ability and a high-ability worker on level 1. In that case, under a combined contract the probability of promoting the more talented worker isp (ê c h ;ê c h ; t 1 ) > 1=2 due top (ê i ;ê j ; t 1 ) = 1 p (ê j ;ê i ; t 0 ) and (28). Altogether, the selection quality of an internal labor market with a job-promotion scheme (i.e., of a combined contract) is strictly better than that of external recruiting (i.e., of two separate contracts).
Furthermore, it is interesting to contrast our combined contract with a standard job-promotion tournament where wages are attached to jobs, i.e., tournament prizes are …xed rather than determined by the incentive scheme for the next level. Note that, in our model, the separate contract for hierarchy level 1 corresponds to a standard promotion scheme: The relative performance pay w H can also be interpreted as a …xed wage attached to the next hierarchy level. Since level-1 e¤ort is higher under the combined contract,ê c h >ê s h , we obtain the following result.
Corollary 1 Combining job-promotion with incentive pay on the next hierarchy level always improves the selection quality of a job-promotion tournament. ê;ê; t 1 ) =p 1 (ê;ê; t 1 ) +p 2 (ê;ê; t 1 ) (27) =p 1 (ê;ê; t 1 ) p 1 (ê;ê; t 0 ) (29) > 0.
Proof.p (ê
In the introduction and at the end of Section 3, we mentioned empirical puzzles that contradict standard tournament theory but can be explained in our model. One of these puzzles was that wages are not attached to jobs and, therefore, to hierarchy levels. As has been shown in this section, the selection quality of standard job-promotion tournaments can be signi…cantly improved by replacing wages that are attached to jobs with incentive pay such as a bonus scheme. Hence, missing wages-attached-to-jobs in the empirical literature on …rms' wage policies can be nicely explained by the existence of unobserved worker heterogeneity.
To sum up, we have shown that the dominance of an internal labor market over spot contracting and external recruiting continues to hold under unobserved worker heterogeneity. Moreover, with unobserved heterogeneity, we have a double advantage of internal labor markets -better incentives by utilizing workers'rents from higher tiers and a better selection quality. If e¤ort and ability are complements, both advantages will reinforce each other. Finally, we have compared an internal labor market structure that combines a job-promotion scheme and incentive pay on higher hierarchy levels with a standard job-promotion rule, which attaches wages to jobs. The result of Corollary 1 has pointed out that the former personnel policy increases the chances of assigning the worker with the higher unobservable talent to the management job.
Observed Worker Heterogeneity
In this section, we extend the basic model to analyze how observed heterogeneity of workers a¤ects optimal employment contracting. In contrast to Section 4.1, where unobserved worker heterogeneity persists across hierarchy levels, we now assume that all workers share the same abilities in the production task, but di¤er in their managerial talents. On the …rst hierarchy level, we maintain the assumptions of the basic model. On level 2, however, the …rm's valuation of the manager's e¤ort now depends on the latter's ability. In particular, if the …rm assigns worker i to the management task, i's e¤ort choice e yields the value v (e) + i , i = A; B. Here, A and B are independent draws from a probability distribution of the same random variable, which re ‡ects workers'di¤erent talents for the management position. At the beginning of the …rst period, nobody knows i . However, during the course of that period, the …rm gets to know the workers and, …nally, can assess who is better suited for the managerial task. Hence, the …rm observes i at the end of the …rst period. No other party is able to assess the workers'suitability for level 2 and, as a consequence, i is non-veri…able. Instead of promoting a worker from level 1 to the management position, the …rm can also hire an external candidate of unknown talent. Then, the expected monetary value of managerial e¤ort is v(e) + E[ i ]:
For simplicity, we assume that ability can be either high or low, i 2 f0; g, where > 0: The probability that i is high is 1=2. Accordingly, at the end of period 1, there are four possible situations with respect to the outcome of the tournament:
(i) both winner and loser have high ability, (ii) only the winner has high ability, (iii) both have low ability, (iv) the winner has low ability whereas the loser's ability is high. In cases (i) and (ii), the …rm cannot do better than promoting the tournament winner, because he is of the highest possible ability. However, in case (iii), from a pure selection perspective, the …rm would be better o¤ by hiring an external candidate for the management position, receiving an expected ability of =2 instead of zero. In case (iv), the …rm prefers to promote the loser of the tournament instead of the winner.
Hence, the …rm faces the following trade-o¤: If it ex-ante announces to always promote internally, thereby strengthening level-1 e¤ort incentives, it forgoes the possibility to hire a better suited external candidate for the management job when both workers are of low ability. Moreover, in case (iv), the …rm encounters a commitment problem: Since the relative performance signal from level 1 is not veri…able, the …rm cannot commit to promote the tournament winner when he is less suited for the management position than his colleague. We assume that the …rm can contract to exclusively promote internally, but has no means to commit to promoting the tournament winner in case (iv).
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Consequently, the …rm can choose between two contractual forms denoted by C 1 and C 2 . Under contract C 1 , the …rm announces to always promote internally. In particular, in cases (i)-(iii), the winner of the tournament becomes the new manager whereas, in case (iv), the tournament loser is promoted. By contrast, under contract C 2 , the …rm leaves open the possibility to hire from the external labor market. It announces to promote the winner of the tournament only if he is of high ability, i.e., in cases (i) and (ii). In case (iii), however, the …rm recruits the new manager from the external labor market. In case (iv), analogously to C 1 , the tournament loser is promoted.
By choosing between the contracts C 1 and C 2 , the …rm decides on the probability with which the tournament winner is promoted, which we denote by C , C = C 1 ; C 2 . Furthermore, C denotes the expected ability of the worker that is assigned to level 2 under contract C. The values of C and C are given in the following table.
Accordingly, contract C 1 uses the level-2 rent more e¤ectively for level-1 incentive provision because the tournament winner is promoted with higher probability. How-ever, contract C 2 implies a higher expected managerial ability because it allows for external recruitment in case the production workers are of low ability. Now assume the …rm has chosen contract C and consider the workers'decision problems. On level 2, the worker faces the same decision problem as in the basic model. Thus, assume that e satis…es the second-level incentive constraint (1) and, moreover, the second-level participation constraint (2) holds. Then, on the …rst level, worker A choosesê A to maximize
with r(e) given by (6), whereas, by choosingê B , worker B maximizes
Thus, the symmetric equilibrium on level 1 is implicitly given bŷ
The …rst-level participation constraint is
Hence, given contract C 1 , the …rm has to solve (2), (23), (42), (43).
The restrictions (1) and (2) are the incentive and participation constraints, respectively, for level 2. Conditions (42) and (43) are the new incentive constraint and participation constraint, respectively, for level 1. Finally, (23) are the limited-liability constraints. Analogously to the problem of determining the optimal combined contract for homogeneous workers (Proposition 2), we can simplify the …rm's problem 
where
Given contract C 2 , the …rm solves
subject to (1), (2), (23), (42), (43).
Here, E denotes the …rm's level-2 pro…t when an external candidate is hired for the job on the second hierarchy tier. To such a candidate, the …rm o¤ers the optimal separate contract for level 2. Consequently, we have E = v(e s ) r(e s ) c(e s ).
Proceeding in analogy to contract C 1 , 27 the …rm's problem boils down to
where C 2 (e;ê) = 2v(ê) w (ê) + 3 4 v(e) c(e) 2 3 r(e) + 1 4 E Let (ê C ; e C ) denote the e¤ort levels that the …rm induces under contract C. Then, the …rm allows for external recruitment if and only if
The left-hand side of inequality (45) corresponds to the incentive e¤ect of establishing an exclusively internal labor market (contract C 1 ) instead of sometimes recruiting on the external labor market (contract C 2 ). By contrast, the right-hand side of (45) characterizes the bene…cial selection e¤ect of external recruitment. Since the left-hand side is independent of while the right-hand side is increasing in , we obtain the following result.
Proposition 5 The …rm recruits externally with positive probability if workers dif-26 See the additional pages for the referees. 27 Under contract C 2 , for a given e¤ort pair (ê; e), the …rm minimizes implementation costs
fer su¢ ciently strongly in their abilities, i.e., if is su¢ ciently large.
According to Proposition 5, when the …rm is able to observe some worker characteristics that a¤ect productivity on the second hierarchy level, the …rm may want to leave open the possibility of external recruitment for the level-2 job. External recruitment occurs with positive probability whenever the …rm will su¤er a su¢ ciently large productivity loss if it assigns a low-ability type to the management position. Then, in order to improve selection, the …rm sacri…ces part of the incentive e¤ect of the level-2 rent for level-1 workers.
As mentioned in the introduction, Holmström (1994a, 1994b) , among others, 28 document external recruiting on higher hierarchy levels. This observation contradicts the strict version of an internal labor market as well as traditional models on job-promotion tournaments since external hiring destroys internal career incentives. According to Proposition 5, the observation of entry ports on higher levels is in line with our model. Such a weaker form of an internal labor market will be favored by the …rm if it learns workers' abilities during their careers and selection of appropriate employees for management positions is an important issue relative to incentive provision.
Conclusion
We analyzed a two-tier hierarchy where workers compete in a rank-order tournament on level 1. On the second tier, a worker carries out a managerial task leading to an individual performance signal, which can be used in a bonus contract. Workers are protected by limited liability on either hierarchy level. We have shown that interlinking the incentive schemes from the two tiers by a job-promotion tournament, thereby creating an internal labor market, has two advantages: First, rents from level 2 can be used to create incentives for level 1. As a consequence, the …rm may even implement …rst-best e¤ort on the second hierarchy level although the worker earns a strictly positive rent on this level. Second, in case of unobserved heterogeneity, a combined contract has the additional advantage of improving the tournament's selection quality in promoting the most talented internal worker. If, however, some characteristics of a worker's ability are observable, the …rm may prefer to hire level-2 workers from the external labor market when it turns out that the internal candidates are of low ability. Thus, if selection of high-ability workers is su¢ ciently important, it may be optimal to have ports of entry on higher hierarchy levels. In this case, level-2 workers hired from the outside market obtain a di¤er-ent contract than internally promoted workers. In particular, external candidates receive lower bonuses and, consequently, lower rents than internal ones. Hence, our analysis implies that …rms that utizilize internal labor markets to exploit higherlevel rents for incentive provision on lower tiers should o¤er lower-powered incentive contracts to external hires than to internal ones. Combining a promotion tournament with a bonus scheme on the next tier of the hierarchy might lead to further advantages if there is the possibility of sabotage among heterogeneous workers. For example, Münster (2007) shows that more able workers may be deterred from participating in a tournament if contestants can sabotage each other. Then, the advantage of higher talent is completely erased since more able workers are sabotaged more heavily than less able ones, thereby equalizing the winning probabilities of the heterogeneous workers. However, if the winner prize of the tournament is a bonus contract that entails higher rents for more able workers, the problem of adverse participation may be mitigated.
In a di¤erent setting, the combination of a tournament with a bonus scheme may be useful to make the competition between heterogeneous contestants more even. As is known from the tournament literature, the more uneven competition the less e¤ort will be chosen in equilibrium. Suppose that unobserved talent and e¤ort are substitutes on each hierarchy level and not complements as in our paper. Then, workers'rents from a bonus contract on the second hierarchy level may be decreasing in ability. As a result, introducing a bonus scheme would mitigate the problem of uneven competition on level 1. The reason is that more able workers have lower expected rents from winning the tournament than less able ones. If the …rm cannot use handicaps (e.g., due to only ordinal information) to counterbalance ability di¤erences, such decreasing rents would be an appropriate instrument for regulating competition.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 2
We can solve problem (21)-(23) in two steps: First, we derive the …rm's minimum cost for inducing a given pair of e¤ort levels (ê; e). Then, we use the optimal cost function to solve the pro…t maximization problem and determine the optimal e¤ort pair (ê c ; e c ). The cost minimization problem for a given e¤ort pair (ê; e) reads as
. Thus, in combination with the incentive constraint (19), we obtain
where w (ê) is given by (10) and r(e) by (6).
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Using (46), the …rst-level participation constraint (20) boils down to
Furthermore, the second-level participation constraint (2) becomes
Thus, substituting for the tournament prize spread w H w L and the bonus spread
and
By Lemma 1, we obtain b c L = 0 for the optimal low bonus: This satis…es the 29 Recall that w (ê) is the prize spread necessary to induceê under separate contracts. However, note that w (ê) will usually be di¤erent from w participation constraint for the second hierarchy level (48) and is also best for ensuring that w H = w (ê) b L r(e) + w L 0. Hence, we can skip constraint (48) and obtain min w L 2w L + w (ê) + c(e) subject to (47) and
The cost-minimizing w L is given by
From (13), we know that
We now have to distinguish two cases. The …rst case is
Then, w L = 0 and w H = w (ê) r(e). In the second case,
Hence, w L = r(e) w (ê) and w H = 0. In the …rst case, the …rm's expected labor costs are
and in the second scenario the …rm's costs amount to
We can now turn to the second step of the solution procedure, the solution of the …rm's pro…t maximization problem. The optimal e¤ort pair (ê c ; e c ) solves
We can see that in case 2 (i.e., the second line of the maximization problem) the …rm's objective function is monotonically increasing inê. Hence, for each e, the …rm chooses the maximum possibleê, which makes the given restriction just binding, i.e., w (ê) = r(e). This implies that case 2 becomes a special case of case 1. Thus, the …rm never wants to induce e¤ort levels (ê; e) such that w (ê) < r(e). Doing so would imply that 0 = w c H < w c L . Intuitively, this means that, by implementing an adverse relative performance scheme, the …rm pays for reducing …rst-level incentives that stem from the second-level rent r(e). Such a contract cannot be optimal. The …rm would be better o¤ by setting 0 = w c H = w c L , thereby increasing …rst-level e¤ort and reducing workers'…rst-period rents.
Hence, we are always in the …rst case. Consequently, w c L = 0 and the results of the proposition follow.
Proof of Proposition 3 (i) Let
s and c denote the …rm's respective pro…ts under the two contractual forms, i.e.,
Under a combined contract, the …rm can induce the same level-2 e¤ort as under the optimal separate contracts by o¤ering the bonuses b (ii)ê c =ê s immediately follows from examining the objective functions (14) and (24). e c > e s follows from r 0 (e) > 0, which we have proven in Lemma 1, and r 00 (e) > 0, which follows from our regularity assumptions and is straightforward to check. It remains to prove result (iii). Due to the binding restriction, we can consider e as an implicitly de…ned function ofê, i.e., e (ê) with
Moreover, the …rm's objective function (24) becomes
The respective …rst-order condition is
Hence, compared to the case where the restriction is non-binding, we either have higher e¤ort at hierarchy level 1 and lower e¤ort at level 2, or vice versa. Inserting @e=@ê in (50) yields
Recall that w 0 (ê) > 0 and r 0 (e) > 0. The optimal e¤ort, e c , must therefore satisfy Now consider the e¤ort choice on hierarchy level 1 under a binding restriction (25) . Suppose that the …rm wants to implement the same e¤ort level as under a non-binding restriction, i.e.,ê s = arg maxê f2v(ê) w(ê)g. However, since (25) is binding in this situation, the corresponding level-2 e¤ort is below the optimal one, e F B . Of course, the …rm can raise e to increase v (e) c (e), but then it has to increaseê as well because of @e=@ê > 0. Whether such an adjustment is bene…cial to the …rm or not depends on the functional forms. In any case, since both functions 2v(ê) w(ê) and v (e) c (e) are strictly concave, the …rm will never raise e above e F B . This is because, if e > e F B andê >ê s , the …rm can increase pro…ts by decreasing both e¤ort levels, while keeping (25) binding. This proves e c < e F B .
Since e c < e F B implies v 0 (e c ) c 0 (e c ) > 0, from (50) we obtain that the corresponding optimal e¤ort on hierarchy level 1 must satisfy 2v 0 (ê) w 0 (ê) < 0.
Thus, this e¤ort must be larger than the optimal level-1 e¤ort under a non-binding restriction (25). Since that e¤ort was identical with the optimal level-1 e¤ort under separate contracts,ê s , we haveê c >ê s under the binding restriction.
7 Appendix for Referees
Modi…ed Limited-Liability Constraints
In this section, we reconsider the problem (21)- (22) of a combined contract in the basic model where the limited-liability constraints (23) are replaced by w L 0, w H + b L 0 and w H + b H 0. We will show that these modi…cations do not change our results. Again, we start with minimizing the …rm's cost for inducing a given pair of e¤ort levels (ê; e):
subject to (1), (2), (19), (20) The last non-negativity constraint is less strong than the second one and can thus be skipped. Since b L does not appear in the objective function but only in the second-level participation constraint, we can set b L = 0 (or any other b L r(e)). Moreover, since 1 2 w (ê) ĉ(ê) 0, the …rst constraint is satis…ed whenever w L 0 and can, therefore, also be skipped. Altogether, we obtain the same cost minimization problem as in Subsection 6.1 (Proof of Proposition 2), where we assumed
The intuition is as follows. If w L ; b L + w H ; b H + w H 0, a negative bonus b L can be used to decrease rents on the second tier. However, all these rents serve as indirect incentives for the …rst tier. Hence, these rents do not constitute costs for the …rm so that it cannot bene…t from lowering them. Finally, if the rents are so high that they provide too strong incentives for the …rst tier, w H = 0 anyway.
Combined Contract under Unobserved Heterogeneity
Step 1 Hence, w L = max 0;ĉ (ê) 1 2 w(ê); r (e) w(ê) :
We know that 1 2 w(ê) ĉ (ê) 0; otherwise,ê would not be an equilibrium strategy. Thus, w L = max f0; r (e) w(ê)g :
We have to distinguish two cases. First, w H w L = w(ê) r (e) 0. Then, w L = 0 and w H = w(ê) r (e) :
Second, w H w L = w(ê) r (e) < 0. Then, w L = r (e) w(ê) and w H = 0:
In the …rst case, the …rm's expected labor costs are w(ê) + 2w L + c (e) = w(ê) + c (e) and in the second they amount to w(ê) + 2w L + c (e) = 2r (e) w(ê) + c (e) :
Step 2: Maximizing expected pro…ts Therefore, the optimal e¤ort pair (ê c ; e c ) solves The solution procedure is analogous to the one in Proposition 2. First, we consider the …rm's problem of minimizing implementation costs for a given pair of e¤ort levels (ê; e). (1), (2), (23), (42), (43).
By using (10), the incentive constraint (42) can be rewritten as 
Recall that the second-level participation constraint can be written as
Using (51) 
